Religious Pluralism and the Buridan's Ass Paradox by Kvanvig, Jonathan L.
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (2009), pp. 1–26
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 
AND THE BURIDAN’S ASS PARADOX
JONATHAN L. KVANVIG
Baylor University
Abstract. The paradox of Buridan’s Ass involves an animal facing two equally adequate 
and attractive alternatives, such as would happen were a hungry ass to confront two bales 
of hay that are equal in all respects relevant to the ass’s hunger. Of course, the ass will 
eat from one rather than the other, because the alternative is to starve. But why does this 
eating happen? What reason is operative, and what explanation can be given as to why 
the ass eats from, say, the left bale rather than the right bale? Why doesn’t the ass remain 
caught between the options, forever indecisive and starving to death? Religious pluralists 
face a similar dilemma, a dilemma that I will argue is more difficult to address than the 
paradox just described.
The paradox of Buridan’s Ass involves an animal facing two equally adequate 
and attractive alternatives, such as would happen were a hungry ass to 
confront two bales of hay that are equal in all respects relevant to the ass’s 
hunger. Of course, the ass will eat from one rather than the other, because 
the alternative is to starve. But why does this eating happen? What reason 
is operative, and what explanation can be given as to why the ass eats from, 
say, the left bale rather than the right bale? Why doesn’t the ass remain 
caught between the options, forever indecisive and starving to death?1
Religious pluralists face a similar dilemma, a dilemma that I will argue 
is more difficult to address than the paradox just described. According 
to religious pluralists, there is enough truth in any religion (or perhaps 
some special subset of religions, such as the major world religions) to yield 
the soteriological benefits promised by the great religions of the world. 
1 Originally, the point was not taken to generate a paradox, but rather a reductio of 
John Buridan’s theory of free choice, where freedom could consist in inaction, in the ability 
to defer for further deliberation any decision that isn’t absolutely certain. The example is 
not discussed by Buridan, but can be found as early as Aristotle’s De Caelo 295b32.
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This great good is available, not solely on the basis of allegiance to some 
particular religion, but to any among several. Religious pluralists need 
not hold that any religion is as good as any other, or that every religion 
is suitable for obtaining such a great good. They do hold, however, that 
there is more than one tasty religious bale of hay in sight.
The Standard Taxonomy and Its Discontents
The usual classification scheme in which pluralism finds its home divides 
options into exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism (“the EIP scheme,” 
as I will refer to it). An initial clarification can be made with an example. 
Suppose there are two religions, Christianity and Buddhism, and we 
use the term “heaven” to refer to whatever great good a religion offers. 
Pluralists think both Christians and Buddhists attain heaven in virtue of 
adhering to their own home religion, exclusivists think that only one of 
the two can attain heaven (in virtue of adhering to the one true religion), 
and inclusivists think that both Christians and Buddhists can attain 
heaven (in virtue of the truth of the one true religion). Suppose, then, 
that it is Christianity that is the true religion. A Christian exclusivist bars 
Buddhists from heaven (so long as they do not convert to Christianity), 
while a Christian inclusivist claims that Buddhists can go to heaven, 
but any Buddhist in heaven will be there because of the work of God in 
Christ making it possible.
This example helps to explain the general character of the classification 
scheme. More generally, let us begin with a distinction between alethic 
and soteriological adequacy. A religion is alethically adequate if and 
only if the claims of the religion are true. It is soteriologically adequate 
if and only if it is effective in securing the great goods religions claim 
are available for their adherents (which I will refer to here as “salvation,” 
though without intending anything beyond reference to the great goods 
in question). Using this distinction, we can understand the positions in 
question in terms of what they say about the relationship between truth 
and salvation. Exclusivists lean toward a one-to-one correspondence 
between alethic and soteriological considerations, tending to hold that 
salvation depends on the truth of the view in question and one’s adher-
ence or commitment to this truth. Pluralists of the simple variety view 
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alethic and soteriological considerations as relatively unrelated, so that 
pretty much any religion, or any major religion, is as good as any other 
at securing soteriological goods. Inclusivists fall somewhere in between 
these two options, holding that the explanatory basis of an adequate 
soteriology depends on the truth of some particular religious viewpoint, 
but denying that commitment to the truth in question must be present 
for soteriological benefits.
The most difficult position to clarify in this scheme is the inclusivist 
position. A typical explanation of this position starts with an adherent of 
a particular religion, e.g., Christianity, who does not want to endorse the 
harsh view that the vast majority of human beings will not go to heaven. 
So, suppose such a Christian holds that not only Christians, but also 
Muslims and Jews and Hindus and Buddhists, as well as representatives 
of other religions, will make it to heaven. Suppose that such a Christian 
holds that such individuals make it to heaven, however, not on the basis 
of their commitment to their own, home religion but rather because 
of the work of God through His Son, Jesus. They are, some will say, 
“anonymous Christians.”2 That is, such a Christian denies the efficacy 
of any religion other than Christianity in securing heaven for anyone; 
this imaginary Christian holds, however, that many non-Christians will 
nonetheless be in heaven because adherence to the one true religion is 
not required for salvation.
I’ll say something in a moment about the vagueness and messiness 
of the EIP scheme, but first I want to distinguish it from a different 
one which emphasizes the degree to which one’s account of salvation 
is revisionary with respect to extant religion. Revisionists about religion 
come in two varieties, but both count as versions of exclusivism. Some 
revisionists think that each religion has a logical core and that the core 
commitments of the major religions are all compatible with each other. 
Such “logical core” revisionists count as exclusivists, since they align alethic 
and soteriological considerations, explaining soteriological consequences 
in terms of commitment to the logical core of whichever religion one 
endorses. Logical core revisionism is an all-but-dead theoretical option, 
however, since it is fairly conclusively refuted by empirical considerations. 
2 This is Karl Rahner’s phrase; see Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the 
Idea of Christianity, translated by William V. Dych (New York: The Seabury Press, 1978).
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Any reasonable account of the core commitments of the major religions 
shows that they disagree with each other.3
A different kind of revisionary view is syncretism, according to which 
none of the major religions is true as it stands, but each contains true 
elements which can be combined into a correct account of religious reality. 
Syncretism tends to be a version of exclusivism, though the matter is a bit 
more complicated since, strictly speaking, most human beings will never 
have thought of the syncretism in question. Syncretists can go in several 
directions here. One option is to endorse the pessimistic view in which 
my religious ancestors delighted: that most of humanity is damned for 
lack of exposure to the truth. More appealing from a moral point of view, 
though, is the option according to which one relaxes the idea of what is 
required to adhere to the one true religion, counting the faintest glimmer 
of insight as sufficient for adherence to the syncretistic truth.
It is here that the messiness of the EIP scheme becomes obvious. 
On this scheme, positions are distinguished by what they say about two 
items. One concerns the salvific adequacy of a particular religious form of 
life, and the other concerns the alethic adequacy of a view and the kind 
of commitment required toward that view. Exclusivists are identified 
as those who hold that there is one correct religion, and that doxastic 
commitment to it is necessary for the salvific adequacy of such a form 
of life. Yet, when put this way, it is hard to think of any examples of 
exclusivism. If we take Christianity as the example and assume it to be 
true, there is no major Christian position that requires adherence to the 
entire truth as a condition for salvation. Exclusivist Christians, of course, 
claim that one must be a Christian in order to be saved, but the doxastic 
commitments required are rarely specified precisely, and with good reason. 
As soon as precision comes into the picture, counterexamples in the form 
of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob threaten the account, even if articulators of 
3 There is a different use of the notion of the logical core of a religion that is unobjec-
tionable. Any given religion can have multiple manifestations in terms of denominations, 
sects, cults, etc. Each such manifestation differs in doctrinal commitments, and thus we 
might seek the logical core of a religion. Adherents of a given manifestation may thus grant 
that adherents of other, e.g., denominations, may go to heaven in virtue of commitment 
to the logical core of the true religion. As I use the term “logical core revisionism” in the 
text, this appeal to the logical core of a religion doesn’t constitute an instance of logical 
core revisionism.
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a given precisification are willing to bite the bullet on the eternal destiny 
of saints of other religions.
We can adopt this scheme if we refuse to pretend that it removes 
all vagueness from our categorizing. Vagueness is nearly everywhere in 
language, and though precisification is often helpful from a theoretical 
perspective, we can often make progress without it. A clear example of 
vagueness occurs when a syncretist allows the faintest glimmer of recogni-
tion of truth to be salvifically adequate. How should we classify this view? 
In some respects, it looks like inclusivism, since a practicing Christian, or 
Jew, or Hindu, could achieve salvation but only because of the truth of 
the syncretistic view in question (which is, by hypothesis, incompatible 
with each of the faiths in question). In another respect, it looks very 
much like certain positions that one is inclined to classify as exclusivist. 
Most traditional Christians have maintained that the saints in the Old 
Testament are saved, but it is impossible to identify any distinctively 
Christian commitments of such individuals. That they had such beliefs 
would be a suggestion for which there is very little evidence. The usual 
explanation told here by traditional Christians cites the glimmer of under-
standing such individuals possessed, plus their faith in and commitment 
to the God of the Abrahamic traditions. The point to note, however, is the 
similarity here with what the syncretistic position in question maintains: 
namely, that the faintest glimmer of a grasp of truth is enough by way of 
doxastic commitment to make salvation possible.
I will not attempt here to resolve this vagueness in the EIP scheme, for 
my interest is not in the distinction between inclusivism and exclusivism 
but rather in the distinction between both of these and pluralism. On this 
score, the EIP scheme is less troubling, since one can sort the pluralists 
from the remainder simply in terms of whether some commitment to the 
truth is part of the soteriology advanced.
A caveat remains in order nonetheless. Things can become complicated 
and difficult to manage if what looks like pluralism is combined with 
unusual claims about truth. For example, consider John Hick’s Kantian ac-
count on which the major religions are thought of in quasi-Kantian terms 
as different phenomenal windows on the same ultimate noumenal reality. 
The proper way to categorize this view depends on what it says about truth. 
To be thoroughly Kantian, the view will have to think of truth in terms 
of the phenomenal realm, but that turns out to require, to understate the 
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point, a rather lengthy detour into the logic of inconsistency (since, at 
what Hick terms the phenomenal level, we find all the particular claims 
of the various religious, claims that are obviously inconsistent with each 
other). Though Hick flirted with the idea that the salvation of his view 
lies in the direction of exploring such a logic,4 it is hard to take seriously, 
even in a time when dialetheism has become a serious philosophical 
position.5 The problem is that, when truth is conceived in Kantian fashion 
as pertaining to the phenomenal realm and one holds that all religions 
(or major religions) are alethically as well off as any others, there are way 
more contradictions than even dialetheists are willing to countenance. If 
one can swallow all the contradictions, such a view counts as a version of 
exclusivism, since it is in virtue of commitment to the truth that salvation 
is achieved. But, oh, the pain of swallowing.
Easier on the digestive system is the view that characterizes truth in 
terms of the noumenal realm, leaving Hick’s view as a version of plural-
ism, since none of the phenomenal claims can strictly accord with the 
noumenal truth. When combined with Hick’s view that all the major 
world religions are equally good from a soteriological perspective,6 the 
view that results is paradigmatically pluralistic.7 On this view, salvific 
adequacy for a view comes apart about as radically as is possible from any 
requirement of doxastic commitment to the truth.
As briefly indicated already, I will talk here in terms of the existence 
of God and the salvific promise of heaven, rather than in terms of some 
great good available for human beings and attachments to the Real with 
a capital ‘R’, but I want it to be understood that such language is not 
meant to restrict the options that pluralists might have in talking about 
4 The speculation about logics of inconsistency can be found in Hick’s contribution to 
The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity, edited by Kevin Meeker and Philip Quinn 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), “Religious Pluralism and Salvation,” 54–66.
5 See, e.g., Paraconsistent Logic, ed. G. Priest, R. Routley and J. Norman (Amsterdam: 
Philosophia Verlag, 1989).
6 See, e.g., John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press, 1989) and Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religion (New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993).
7 To continue the metaphor in the text, we still don’t have a simple gustatory delight, 
however. The claim that all religions are phenomenal windows on the same ultimate 
noumenal reality is itself both true and about the phenomenal realm, it would seem. But 
if nothing about the phenomenal realm is true, then this claim can’t be true either.
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religious goods. I will speak of God and heaven for the sake of simplicity, 
leaving open the option that a religious pluralist might hold that the 
religious good in question does not involve theism or an afterlife (and 
leaving open the option that the great goods in question obtain both in 
the present and in the life to come). All that is essential to the position is 
a denial of the claim that adherence to some one true religion is necessary 
for securing the great goods that religions proffer, however cognitively 
feeble that adherence might be conceived to be.
I also leave open whether there is one great good that adherents of 
all the acceptable religions are successful in achieving. An imaginable 
position, though one hard to find any serious defense of, is relativistic 
pluralism, according to which the great good achieved varies depending 
on the religion to which one adheres. Perhaps some religions are useful 
in achieving Nirvana and others in securing heaven as understood by 
Christians. Nothing said here will presume any position on the issue of 
relativism for pluralists.
The point of this terminological digression is to make clear which 
view I want to discuss when talking about pluralism. It is easy to see why 
pluralism is different from exclusivism, but a bit harder to distinguish from 
inclusivism. My discussion here is meant to provide a basis for distinguish-
ing relatively inclusivist adherents of a religion8 from the focus of this paper, 
as well as to separate revisionary and syncretistic views from pluralist views. 
Neither inclusivist nor revisionary views are the target of the present essay, 
but only those who believe acceptability to God and resultant presence 
in heaven can be achieved on the basis of adherence to any of a number 
of religions, with no religion having a special status which makes it sote-
riologically superior to any other religion, and where the explanation of 
soteriological adequacy does not advert to the distinctive claims of any 
religion at all. For pluralists, the cognitive dimension of the religious life 
8 I use the relativity qualifier since the difference among inclusivist and exclusivist 
Christians here is a matter of degree. Even the staunchest exclusivist Christians believe that 
some adherents of the Jewish faith will be in heaven, in spite of having no acquaintance 
with Jesus and no allegiance to any of the core teachings of Christianity about Jesus, his 
birth, life, death, and resurrection: for example, the great figures of the Old Testament. 
Some of these Christians also endorse a dispensationalist story as to why no one who lives 
after the time of Jesus has the same opportunity, but the point remains that they must 
interpret the “no other name” passage so that presence in heaven does not require, in one’s 
earthly life, any particular mental attitude toward that first-century person in Palestine.
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may be necessary to the entire experience of religiosity but the truth of the 
claims is explanatorily otiose regarding the question of salvific adequacy.
Pluralists, unlike inclusivists and exclusivists, must face the paradox 
of Buridan’s Ass. For they believe that achieving heaven is a surpassing 
good, but also hold that there are a number of different paths to it. So, 
which path should a fully informed and rational individual take? Or is the 
result the damnable analogue of Buridan’s ass starving to death through 
the inability to make a rational choice? We can begin to address this issue 
by considering the structure of a solution to the paradox conceived as an 
attack on the possibility of rational action in such a situation.
Reasons and Contrastive Reasons
Here’s what we know about the version of the paradox I’ll explore here: a 
proper theory of rationality does not require the ass to starve to death. The 
concept of rationality I’ll focus on here is a teleological one, identifying 
items as rational when and only when they are appropriately related to 
the relevant goal in the domain in question. I will assume here that the 
epistemic goal can be explained in terms of the concept of truth and that 
the practical goal can be clarified in terms of self-interest or well-being. 
Given these assumptions, we can easily see that it is contrary to the 
well-being of the ass to opt for starving to death in such a situation, and 
so we know that a correct theory of rationality will not require the ass 
to remain in a state of indecision forever. Hence, it follows that it is not 
irrational for the ass to eat from either bale. What we should say about 
the question of explanation, the question of why the ass eats from, say, the 
left bale rather than the right, is left open at this point. What is not left 
open, however, is whether it is rational for the ass to starve to death.
From this point, some theorists will want three categories and some 
two. Some will want to classify actions into rational, nonrational, and 
irrational, while others will want to speak only of rational and irrational 
actions. One motivation, in my view, the primary one, for wanting three 
categories is to avoid having to count arbitrary actions as rational, where 
an arbitrary action is defined as one of several actions possible for the cir-
cumstances in question, where no reason can be found, relative to the goal 
in question, for preferring that action to its competitors (as in the paradox).
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This argument for the existence of three categories can be rebutted 
by the following considerations. First, note that a theory of rationality 
should be perfectly general, applying both to actions and mental states 
(beliefs, desires, hopes, wishes, etc.). In the domain of belief, however, the 
threat of skepticism looms large if one is willing to endorse a connection 
between reasons and contrastive reasons. In the former case, we speak 
of having a reason to believe some claim p; in the latter case, we speak 
of having a reason to believe p rather than q, where q is an alternative 
to p (i.e., is a member of a set of claims including p where each member 
excludes all other members and where the set is exhaustive in the sense 
that some member of the set must be true). In the case of the Buridan’s 
Ass Paradox, we may be inclined to say that the ass has no reason to eat 
from, say, the left bale because it has no reason to eat from the left bale rather 
than the right. To say such a thing is to endorse a connection between 
reasons and contrastive reasons, and an analogue of such a connection in 
the realm of belief is:
Reason R is an adequate reason to believe p only if, for any alternative 
q to p, R is an adequate reason to believe p rather than believe q.
Such a principle threatens one with skepticism almost immediately. Sup-
pose you have a visual experience of a red object on the table, and believe 
as a result that there is a red object on the table. Is your experience an 
adequate reason for your belief ? By the above principle, it is so only if it 
is an adequate reason for believing that there is a red object on the table 
rather than that there is a black light shining on a non-red object, making 
it appear red. If the experience is a contrastive reason of this sort, it is 
also an adequate reason for believing that there is no black light shining 
making the object appear red when it isn’t. Yet, if the question arises 
whether appearances are deceiving in this way, it would be pathetically 
bad epistemic practice to cite the very experience itself to assuage such 
concerns.
The problem of explaining how one can know that appearances are 
not deceiving in this way has come to be called the Problem of Easy 
Knowledge.9 Various proposals have been developed in response to the 
9 The first formulation of the problem is by Stewart Cohen, “Basic Knowledge and 
the Problem of Easy Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 
309–329.
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problem,10 but whatever the proposal, any plausible approach to the 
problem will require denying the principle above. Adequate reasons for 
belief do not have to be adequate contrastive reasons for belief, and thus, 
in this limited sense, beliefs can be both arbitrary (in the technical sense 
described above) and yet rational. Perhaps acquiring an adequate reason 
for thinking that appearances are not deceptive in the way imagined is 
not especially difficult–for example, perhaps all one needs to do is to 
look briefly at the lighting in the room to acquire an adequate reason 
for thinking that there is no black light causing deceptive appearances. 
Perhaps, as well, there are other ways in which reasons and contrastive 
reasons align themselves — for example, even though in general, reasons 
don’t need to be contrastive reasons, perhaps they must rule out alterna-
tives that are psychologically salient in the right way. This possibility will 
become important later in our discussion, but for now the important point 
to note is that neither of these points rescues the claim that reasons must 
be contrastive reasons in the theory of rational belief.
Given that a theory of rationality ought to be fully general, we should 
expect the same result in the theory of rational action. If we find the same 
result there, then we can say that arbitrary actions, too, can be rational, 
i.e., that reasons for doing A need not be reasons for doing A rather 
than B for any competing alternative B to A. In this way, the case for a 
category of nonrational actions or beliefs on the basis of considerations 
of arbitrariness (where arbitrariness is understood in limited fashion in 
terms of a denial of a perfect correlation between reasons and contrastive 
reasons) is undermined. It is not true, in general, that arbitrariness is 
incompatible with rationality.
This argument can be summarized concisely as follows. First, define 
arbitrariness in terms of the failure of a requirement that an adequate 
reason be an adequate contrastive reason. Second, note that if arbitrary 
beliefs can be rational, then we should expect that arbitrary actions can 
be rational. Third, consider the Problem of Easy Knowledge, and the way 
in which it demonstrates that arbitrary beliefs can be rational, i.e., that 
10 See, e.g., Peter Klein, “Closure Matters: Academic Skepticism and Easy Knowledge,” 
Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 165–184; Peter Markie, “Easy Knowledge,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, forthcoming; Ram Neta, “A Contextualist Solution to the 
Problem of Easy Knowledge,” in manuscript; Ernest Sosa, “Response,” in Ernest Sosa and 
His Critics, ed. John Greco (Blackwell, 2004), especially his response to Cohen.
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an adequate reason for belief need not be an adequate contrastive reason. 
Finally, note that the particular kind of action for which a category of 
nonrationality was desired is arbitrary actions that fail to be irrational. But 
if arbitrary beliefs can be fully rational, as they must on pain of having 
to endorse radical skepticism, then arbitrary actions can be as well. Thus, 
there is no reason based on this kind of arbitrariness to refuse the conclu-
sion that when such an arbitrary action fails to be irrational, it is rational.
Arbitrary Actions and Arbitrary Choices: 
A Start on Solving the Paradox
This conclusion allows for the possibility of a solution to the Buridan’s 
Ass Paradox. If the ass eats from either bale, there will be no adequate 
contrastive reason for doing so. Yet, if reasons don’t need to be contrastive 
reasons, that allows for the possibility that the eating is rational nonethe-
less. It doesn’t matter which bale the ass eats from, for the action involved 
will be rational either way.
Pointing out the difference between a reason and a contrastive reason 
doesn’t tell us much about the general theory of rationality that might 
include such a distinction. Moreover, even describing vaguely the contours 
of such a general theory is difficult, but it is worth noting in this regard that 
there is a contrastive reason available at a higher level of generality, since 
there is an adequate reason for the ass to eat from one of the two bales 
rather than starve. Perhaps the more specific action inherits its rationality 
in the absence of support by a contrastive reason from the higher-order 
contrastive reason, even though whichever specific token of the general 
type is displayed, that token will count as an arbitrary action. In any case, 
whatever general account is given, it remains the case that arbitrary actions 
can be rational, so we can’t argue that the ass fails to be rational for eating 
from the left bale simply because that action is an arbitrary one.
As pointed out, both beliefs and actions can be arbitrary and yet 
rational. But the notion of arbitrariness here is a technical one, defined in 
terms of the distinction between adequate reasons and adequate contras-
tive reasons. This sense of arbitrariness raises no particular problems for 
the pluralist: the pluralist is in the position of Buridan’s ass, and rationality 
can accompany whatever choice is made.
12 jonathan l. kvanvig
Pluralism and Arbitrariness
The problem for the pluralist arises, however, when we think about other 
notions of arbitrary actions and beliefs. The notion of arbitrariness clari-
fied to this point allows that a factor can confer rationality on an action 
or belief without conferring irrationality on competitors of that action or 
belief. It is compatible with this point, however, that there are important 
differences between the rationality of action and the rationality of belief 
as to why reasons don’t have to be contrastive reasons. As a motive for 
considering this possibility, notice that even though we talk about the 
choice of a religion in much the same was as we talk about the choice the 
ass faces regarding which bale to choose, the language of choice may not 
be altogether appropriate in the realm of religious affiliation. To become 
an adherent of Christianity is not simply a matter of choosing to attend 
Mass or to attend confession or to be baptized. Essential to the story 
is a matter of cognitive commitment, a coming to view the claims of 
Christianity as true and important. Regarding cognitive commitments, 
however, the language of choice presents difficulties. I am sitting in a 
coffee shop and look up, and come to the view that my friend Robert has 
just arrived. To say that I looked up, considered the possibilities and chose 
to view the situation as one involving Robert’s presence is thoroughly 
wrongheaded. In this case, no choice of any sort was involved. Instead, 
the belief resulted because of perception, and the process involved is of a 
general causal sort. Any reconstruction in terms of the language of choice 
would be mistaken.
Perhaps these same points apply to the cognitive commitments in-
volved in becoming an adherent of a religion. One can choose to perform 
the actions associated with being an adherent of a religion, but it may 
be that one must also come to see the claims central to that religion as 
ones that are true in much the same way as I came to see that Robert just 
walked in to this coffee shop. It may be, that is, that the language of choice 
is simply inappropriate in the context of the cognitive commitments 
required to be an adherent of a religion.
Notice as well that the way in which reasons don’t need to be contras-
tive reasons differs in the cognitive realm from the practical realm. In the 
case of the paradox, the ass can rationally eat from the left bale while fully 
aware of the equal attractiveness of the right bale. But the same kind of 
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claim isn’t very plausible about cognitive commitments. It is true that 
Newton can’t be charged with irrationality in belief simply because his 
evidence is compatible with general relativity theory, but it is not true that 
Holmes can rationally believe that the butler did it while being fully aware 
that his evidence is neutral between the butler or the baker having done 
it. Just because a reason doesn’t have to be a contrastive reason doesn’t 
imply that reasons can fail to be contrastive reasons in precisely the same 
way for both beliefs and actions. Since the religious pluralist faces a set 
of alternatives most obviously similar to that of Buridan’s ass, using the 
solution to the paradox outlined above would commit the pluralist to the 
view that the kind of arbitrariness tolerable regarding rational cognitive 
commitments is the same as that regarding rational action. Since such a 
presupposition is false, the pluralist cannot escape the problem raised by 
the paradox in the same way that the paradox itself can be dissolved.
Thinking about the differences in the examples of Newton and Holmes 
reveals differences that are in part psychological: Newton hasn’t even so 
much as conceived of general relativity theory whereas Holmes is imag-
ined to be fully aware of the fact that his evidence is neutral with respect 
to the guilt of either the butler or the baker. Once we begin to think along 
these lines, the question becomes one of examining the psychological 
conditions under which the conferring of rationality is blocked by the 
presence of competitors that these factors do not rule out. In the case 
of belief, from the purely theoretical perspective of getting to the truth 
and avoiding error, the salience of a competitor not ruled out by one’s 
evidence is often sufficient grounds for preventing the rationality of belief. 
Perhaps Newton can be excused for not withholding when it would be 
senseless to hold him responsible for considering relativity theory, but 
you’re not likely to be impressed by Sherlock’s reasoning if he admits that 
his evidence leaves open whether it was the butler or the baker and he 
believes and asserts that it is the butler nonetheless.
This difference is important, because if beliefs are not actions in this 
sense, one cannot follow the pluralists’ advice of just arbitrarily selecting 
one. Cognitive commitments are central to adherence to a religion, and 
cognitive commitments are subject to stronger constraints on arbitrariness 
than are actions.
If pluralism is a mistaken view, there is a straightforward way to answer 
the question about how to go about selecting a religion: find the true one! 
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Some find it harder than others to arrive at a conclusion in such matters, 
but once one comes to see a certain religion as the true one, there is no 
mystery left about the cognitive commitments needed for allegiance to 
that religion. In seeing a particular religion as the true one, one has thereby 
made the cognitive commitments necessary. There is no guarantee that 
this process will itself impart rationality to the beliefs that result, but 
the important point to note here is that the process as so described does 
not guarantee irrationality in the way that Holmes’s admission that the 
evidence is equally well-explained by the guilt of either the butler or the 
baker guarantees the irrationality of his view that the butler did it.
Since resolution for the religious pluralist is more like the resolution 
for Holmes of who committed the murder than it is like the situation 
of the ass who needs to avoid starvation, the kind of arbitrariness toler-
able in a solution to the paradox is inapplicable to the situation of the 
religious pluralist in trying to secure the great goods that religion offers. 
This point raises an interesting quandary: if religious pluralism were true, 
could there be any rational religious pluralists in heaven? For if plural-
ism is correct, it is through adherence to any of a number of religions 
that one secures heaven. And adherence to a religion involves cognitive 
commitments implying seeing the world in a certain way, but religious 
pluralists will have difficulty being characterized by such commitments so 
long as commitments track rationality. To be characterized rationally by 
such commitments, a pluralist would have to commit cognitively to the 
central claims of some religion or other, but a pluralist also believes that 
no religion is soteriologically privileged over any other. Thus, the pluralist 
maintains that whatever cognitive commitments are involved in being 
an adherent of a particular religion are inessential to the soteriological 
efficacy of that religion. Yet, most religions include some uniqueness 
claim, to the effect that the path of salvation is tied to the claims of the 
particular religion in question and that being on the path of salvation 
involves recognizing this point. Religions typically claim, that is, that 
endorsing the claims preached by that religion is essential to salvation. 
The pluralist, however, endorses a meta-dogma as well, one that says that 
alethic commitments come apart from salvific adequacy.
It looks, then, that the possibility of a pluralism that is both rational 
and effective in terms of access to heaven rests on the possibility of 
inconsistent rational beliefs or on the possibility of finding a religion 
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that treats the meta-dogma in question as optional for adherents of that 
religion. Other options do not hold much promise, since the pluralist, 
as understood here, doesn’t wish to become revisionary about religion 
itself. So it is not an option here for a pluralist to join a religion and then 
adopt an unusual construal of what is important from the perspective of 
that religion. Nor is it a very plausible route to take to insist that there 
are as many religions as there are noses of the religiously inclined, in 
order to allow the pluralist to have a set of beliefs adequate for salvation 
no matter what the content. Instead, religious pluralists wish to show 
respect for actual religions, at least the major world religions, and to 
do so, they need to avoid being revisionary or relativistic in these ways. 
Thus, their hopes ride on the possibility of inconsistent rational beliefs 
(where the dogmas of the endorsed religion are inconsistent with the 
meta-dogma definitive of religious pluralism) or of finding a religion 
that treats the meta-dogma in question as optional for adherents of 
that religion.
Neither route is promising. About the possibility of inconsistent ra-
tional beliefs, I will say very little. It is important, though, not to take refuge 
here in either the epistemic paradoxes or the possibility of opaque belief 
contents. In the paradoxes, especially the preface paradox and the lottery 
paradox,11 a common approach claims that the lesson of the paradoxes 
is that rational inconsistent beliefs are possible. Rational inconsistent 
beliefs of this sort, however, depend in an important way on the size of 
the lottery and the sophistication of the book under discussion. If the 
lottery has only two tickets, one can’t rationally believe that some ticket 
will win and that one’s own ticket will lose. If the book has only two claims 
in it, one can’t rationally believe each claim in the book plus believe the 
preface claim that there are mistakes in the book. Here, size matters. In 
the case of religious pluralism, the needed analogy is missing. Pluralists 
11 For further information on the epistemic paradoxes, see Jonathan L. Kvanvig, “The 
Epistemic Paradoxes,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1998. The lottery paradox derives 
a contradiction from noting that one has excellent though non-conclusive reasons for 
thinking that one’s own ticket will lose, and thus reasons for thinking that every ticket will 
lose, despite knowing that some ticket will win. The preface paradox derives a contradiction 
from rational belief in each statement in a book, combined with the author’s expression 
of modesty in the preface that because of the difficulty of the subject matter, errors are 
sure to be found in what has been written.
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need both to endorse the doctrines of the faith tying alethic and salvific 
adequacy and also believe the pluralist commitment that all such doctrines 
are false. The proper analogy here isn’t the existentially quantified preface 
claim, but the universally quantified one: believing that all the claims in 
the book are false. So no mileage can be gotten from the attempt to solve 
the problem for pluralists raised by the Buridan’s ass paradox by appeal 
to the lessons of the paradoxes.
Moreover, even though there are accounts of the nature of belief on 
which a person can rationally believe, e.g., that Cicero was a great orator 
while denying that Tully was, such examples of rational contradictory 
beliefs hold only because of the opacity of belief contents that exist in 
such cases: the person in question is unaware that Cicero is Tully. No such 
opacity is present here, so such examples are no help in rescuing pluralism 
from the problem generated by the Buridan’s ass paradox.
So the problem remains and is pressing, leaving only the hope that 
the dogma tying alethic and salvific adequacy, which religions tend to 
preach, will not be included among the cognitive commitments essential 
for salvation. In order to avoid revisionary attitudes toward religion, plural-
ists will need to look for attitudes of optionality regarding such dogmas 
in the religions themselves. It is part of the pluralist trademark to leave 
religions as they are rather than to try to revise them in a way that more 
accurately reveals their purported logical core. The latter view is a version 
of revisionism, not pluralism; so, the pluralist will need to hold out the 
hope of finding attitudes of optionality within the religion itself in order 
to adhere to it without contradiction.
Requiring the finding of such a religion does not sit well with the 
respect pluralists intend to maintain for at least the major religions of 
the world. Pluralists think religions, at least the major ones, are fine 
as they stand, but the major religions simply do not reflect the kind 
of optionality required for pluralistic rational commitment to them. 
The pluralist seeking rational attainment of heaven needs a religion 
that requires belief in nothing incompatible with the pluralist stance in 
order to avoid the cognitive dissonance that would prevent the rational 
commitments necessary for allegiance to a religion. The attempt to 
commit to a religion on pluralist grounds thus becomes the attempt 
to find a religion that has only cognitive commitments consistent with 
those the pluralist thinks are true. In so doing, however, the pluralist 
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will have ruled out most of the major world religions. Moreover, the 
pluralist will have begun the search for a religion worth having in the 
quite straightforward way of looking for a true one, using whatever 
resources are available, including one’s view that alethic adequacy and 
salvific adequacy are unrelated. In short, the religious pluralist has to 
hope to find a religion that requires no cognitive commitments, no 
particular way of seeing, understanding, and experiencing the universe 
and our place in it.
This difficulty of describing how a pluralist could rationally attain 
heaven results from the insolubility of the Buridan’s Ass paradox when 
applied to situations requiring cognitive commitments. When faced with 
such a situation, one’s only recourse for doing anything that will have as 
a direct and immediate consequence the forming of the requisite beliefs 
is to try to find out what the truth is. That is how human beings go 
about forming beliefs. We could, I guess, go to Mass and hope for the 
best, or some analogue of such for religions other than Christianity, but 
that is not to have made a decision that resolves the paradox. It is only to 
do something which one hopes will result in forgetting one’s pluralism 
while at the same time becoming convinced of the claims of the religion 
in question. A genuine pluralist adherent of a religion is possible only 
when a universal core of religions is found and some such version of 
a religion develops in response to perceived difficulties with the more 
typical exclusivism found in the major religions. In the absence of such 
a development, the Buridan’s ass paradox undermines the possibility of 
rational pluralist salvation.
The same issues would arise for any arbitrary choice of which creeds 
to begin endorsing verbally. One might start talking like an adherent of a 
religion, with the idea that doing such will someday result in a commit-
ment to the view. But in all such cases, the strategy is effective only if the 
pluralists forget their pluralism. The pluralist will have to forget that the 
particular religion one is hoping to achieve commitment to is no better 
than some others, and thus that the propositions which one hopes to 
come to believe that are incompatible with propositions constitutive of 
other religious points of view are not really true. So a fully informed and 
rational individual will simply be unable to commit in such a way as to 
secure heaven, for that is available, according to pluralists, only to those 
committing to some religion or other.
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A Notion of Commitment for Pluralists?
This problem has its source in the distinction between the cognitive 
situation involved in religious commitment and the merely practical 
commitment needed for the ass to keep from starving. The ass doesn’t 
need to hold any beliefs; all that is needed is a decision. But it looks as 
if the pluralist needs beliefs, and in any case, it looks like the pluralist 
needs something beyond a mere decision in favor of one religion over 
another.
This diagnosis of the issue is demanded by the non-revisionary character 
of pluralism. Without such a non-revisionary stance, one might diagnose 
the issue in different ways. Revisionary approaches might question the 
idea that cognitive commitments to any religion are necessary for eternal 
blessedness or that cognitive commitments are essential to religion, regard-
less of what these religions might claim about themselves. The former 
view is at odds with the presupposition of pluralism that religion is central 
to the good life, and though the second idea might gain some support 
from efforts in the last century of moral theory which attempt to give 
non-cognitive construals of the apparently cognitive details of morality 
itself, the revisionary scent of such a proposal is still overwhelming. For 
even if such an account could be defended regarding the moral aspect of a 
religion, it is obvious that there is much more to a religion than its moral 
component, and the appeal to the prospects for non-cognitivism in ethics 
would be nothing more promising than the bizarre proposal that there 
is hope that all odd numbers are prime because the first four are. So the 
conclusion that bears repeating is that pluralists, unlike revisionists, want 
to respect religion as it is, rather than replace it with something more 
philosophically respectable.
We are thus left with the diagnosis above, that the difficulty encoun-
tered arises because of the difference regarding the cognitive commitments 
needed in the matter of religion versus starvation. This diagnosis is a use-
ful one for the pluralist as well, since it suggests a possible avenue of 
escape from the difficulty posed. Standard epistemological approaches 
to cognition emphasize mental states such as belief and experience, but 
there is little reason to suppose that these attitudes tell the entire story of 
cognition. One of the more interesting related attitudes is the attitude of 
acceptance, an attitude that one adopts toward a proposition, assenting to 
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its truth, committing oneself to acting on that proposition and defending 
it in the face of reasonable challenges. Any adequate psychology will 
have to endorse a distinction between belief and acceptance. Perhaps in 
the ideal case, all acceptances are believed to be true, but there is little 
reason to think that one cannot believe things that one does not accept 
and accept things that one does not believe.
Philosophical viewpoints are a good example of the latter. For example, 
one might accept classical logic, rejecting intuitionistic logic, but not actu-
ally believe anything here. At the very least, a realistic assessment should 
deny knowledge of such propositions, and some reflective philosophers 
strive to believe only what they know to be true. They nonetheless accept 
certain philosophical claims, refusing to stymie their discipline by refusing 
to accept anything that they don’t know to be true. If their hopes are 
realized, they accept what they do not believe.
Any psychology influenced by Freud will admit the possibility of 
beliefs in opposition to what one accepts. The process of therapy is sup-
posed to make possible the discovery that the doxastic forces underlying 
behavior are different than the overt stories we tell ourselves about what 
we are doing and why we are doing it. In such cases, it would be possible to 
find out that what one accepts is in conflict with what one believes, where 
the beliefs in question are not readily transparent to casual reflection.
The distinction between beliefs and acceptances might offer a way 
out of the problem here for pluralists. Pluralists might claim that, though 
cognitive commitments are central to many religions, the commitments in 
question are not best conceived in terms of beliefs, but rather in terms of 
acceptances. They must admit, of course, that religions tend to speak rather 
uniformly of cognitive commitments in terms of belief and faith, but there 
is no reason to expect any great philosophical precision to the terminology 
in question. Characterizing religious commitments in terms of acceptance 
rather than belief may require some slight revision of actual religion, but 
not an objectionable sort of revision. In this regard, it is important to 
note that the line between respect for religion as it stands and revision is 
a vague one, since the boundaries of any particular religion are themselves 
not precise and reflective adherents of a religion often change it for the 
better. It is relatively easy to see that adherents of religions that require 
cognitive commitments could maintain orthodoxy while proposing that 
the kind of commitment in question is that of acceptance rather than 
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belief, so there is little reason to classify such a suggestion as requiring a 
revisionary attitude toward religion rather than a pluralistic one.
The advantage in the present context of emphasizing acceptance over 
belief for the pluralist is that acceptance is much more of a voluntary 
matter than is belief. What one accepts is more a matter of how one 
chooses to organize one’s life, what claims to “go to bat for,” which al-
ternatives to argue against, and which stances to advocate both publicly 
and privately, all of which are obviously voluntary. Moreover, it is hard 
to see what objection particular religions might have to such a proposal. 
Consider traditional Christianity, for example. Though many religions 
use the language of belief to describe what is required for salvation, the 
point of such language is found in the contrasting state of unbelief. If a 
person accepts the claims of Christianity in the sense described above, they 
defend the faith, live by it (within the usual caveats about the compatibility 
of saving faith even in the face of continued displays of fallen human 
nature), and approach all of life from its perspective. The discovery of one 
whose commitments were of this nature, but who did not actually believe 
any of it, is not a possibility addressed in the theologies in question, but 
damnation for such would seem to be callous beyond belief.
Of course, one cannot rule out the possibility that some particular 
religion, or version of a religion, would object to this pluralist ploy of 
substituting acceptance for belief. My claim, however, is that the plural-
ist can take some refuge in the distinction and that doing so does not 
automatically force one to become objectionably revisionistic about actual 
religion. In this way, a pluralist can show respect for actual religious 
practice while at the same time avoiding the unsavory result of succumb-
ing to the Buridan’s ass paradox. By emphasizing acceptance rather than 
belief, the pluralist can claim that one can adopt one religion over another 
in precisely the same way that the ass selects one bale from which to eat. 
The choice may be arbitrary, but arbitrariness in the sense in question is 
not incompatible with rationality.
To evaluate this suggestion, it is important to see its formal features. 
The idea is this. There’s a difference between action and belief in that the 
former is voluntary and the latter is not (or at least can’t be relied on to be). 
There is also a difference in the kind of arbitrariness tolerable in rational 
cases of each sort. In both cases, reasons don’t have to be contrastive 
reasons, but one can’t have rational beliefs without being in a position to 
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rule out known competing alternatives12 whereas one can have rational 
actions even in the face of such alternatives. The hope involved in the 
pluralist’s attempt to substitute acceptance for belief is that the latter 
normative difference supervenes on the former factual difference. That is, 
the hope is that because actions are voluntary and beliefs are not, rationality 
in the arena of action can be arbitrary in a way that it cannot be in the 
arena of belief.
This way of trying to rescue the pluralist from the problem arising from 
the Buridan’s Ass Paradox is far from compelling, however. First, let me 
offer the reader the chance to share my own reaction that the explanation 
in question is utterly mysterious. According to this account, what makes 
rationality less restrictive in the domain of action than in the domain of 
belief is that voluntariness is present in the former but not in the latter. 
When such a suggestion is made, I experience perplexity. Why would 
one think this? How does the voluntariness point have the implications 
claimed? The point is far from obvious, and I don’t see any plausibility to 
the claim at all. I hereby invite the reader to share in this perplexity.
Moreover, there is an alternative explanation to consider. If we think 
about the notion of rationality applying to various kinds of mental states 
as well as to actions, we may think in terms of direction of fit to carve a 
distinction among items rationally evaluable. For some such items, the 
direction of fit runs from world-to-item. The classic example here is belief: 
beliefs are supposed to represent the world as it is (in the sense that the 
goal of belief is truth), so the normative direction of fit runs from world 
to belief. The classic example of the other direction is desire: desires tell us 
how we want the world to be, not how it is, so the direction of fit runs from 
desire to world. Since actions function as the outward expression of inner 
items whose direction of fit runs from item to world (an expression of our 
wants, wishes, hopes, fears, and desires), actions too are best conceived in 
terms of item-to-world direction of fit.
If we use the language of connative versus cognitive items to describe 
this distinction, we can find an alternative to the above account in terms of 
voluntariness. Instead of claiming that the more voluntary an item happens 
to be, the less restrictive the demands of rationality on that item, we can 
12 For an account of this notion of being in a position to rule out known competitors, 
see Peter Klein, “Closure Matters: Skepticism and Easy Knowledge,” Philosophical Issues 
14 (2004), pp. 165–184.
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say that the less restrictive demands of rationality apply in the connative 
realm but not in the cognitive realm. This alternative explanation prevents 
the pluralist from escaping the problem arising from the Buridan’s Ass 
Paradox by appeal to the distinction between acceptance and belief, since 
even though acceptance may be more voluntary than belief, it still falls on 
the cognitive side of the divide between the connative and the cognitive. 
For acceptance just as much as for belief, the appropriate direction of fit 
runs from world to item rather than the other way around.
It is important to note here that the notion of acceptance is not sim-
ply a behavioral notion. It, like the notion of belief itself, is assumed not 
to be susceptible to behavioral analysis. This point is important, for if 
it were explicable in this way, accepting the claims of a religion would 
involve no cognitive commitments at all. In such a case, replacing the 
notion of belief in religious commitments with the notion of acceptance 
would simply be the proposal that acting as if the claims in question are 
true is enough for sincere adherence to a religion, and such a proposal is 
surely too revisionist for a pluralist to adopt. It is thus crucial that, though 
acceptances explain some of our behavior, they are not reducible to it. 
Regarding this proposal concerning direction of fit, the experience of 
perplexity may be in order. To say that the direction of fit is what makes 
for greater or less restrictiveness regarding rationality is to say something 
every bit as mysterious and uncompelling as to insist on an explanation 
in terms of voluntariness. Neither suggestion comes accompanied by a 
feeling of insight or the satisfaction we experience when finally achiev-
ing understanding.
Let me be clear that the failure to be accompanied by these psycho-
logical phenomena does not show that either proposal is mistaken. The 
probative value of such points is much weaker than that here. But these 
points are relevant nonetheless, since they describe the kind of ideal ex-
planation we seek regarding any phenomenon, and so the failure to obtain 
such an explanation here gives us some reason, however small, to continue 
wondering whether there is a more revealing explanation to be had.
If we extend our search for an explanation of variations in the restric-
tiveness of rationality beyond those that appeal either to voluntariness 
or direction of fit, I believe there is just such an explanation available. I 
think the correct story to be told is that the default setting for rationality 
is equally restrictive always and everywhere, but that this setting is only 
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a default setting rather than an unalterable one. The kind of rationality 
to which this point applies is the rationality of mental states and actions 
(though of course there are mental states, such as experiences, to which the 
notion does not apply). For each such item, there are at least three settings 
possible. For belief, for example, there is belief, disbelief, and withholding. 
For action, there is performing the action, performing a contrary action, 
and doing nothing. For connative states, such as desire, the story is similar 
to that of belief: there is desiring that a state of affairs obtain, desiring that 
the state of affairs not obtain, and being neutral regarding the obtaining 
of that state of affairs. We can thus identify these three possible settings 
as a positive setting, a neutral setting, and a negative setting.
In general, when the rationality-conferring factors present are equally 
weighted between the positive and negative settings, the rational set-
ting is the neutral setting. That is the default position described above. 
But in certain cases, there can be a meta-reason present as to why the 
neutral setting is the worst option of all, as in the Buridan’s Ass Paradox. 
Rationality here is understood teleologically, leaving open the possibility 
that a meta-reason is present for thinking that even though the positive 
and negative settings are equal as means to the goal in question, the 
neutral setting can be ruled out because it is so counterproductive to 
the goal in question. Thus, in cases of action in which delaying action to 
gather more information is not problematic, the fact that two compet-
ing actions are tied in terms of effectiveness at achieving the goal of 
well-being doesn’t leave one free to perform either action and still be 
rational. The third, neutral setting wins out in such situations. But in 
cases where there is a meta-reason against the neutral setting, then the 
restrictive default setting must give way. The Buridan’s Ass Paradox is 
just such a case, where the meta-reason in question is that adopting the 
neutral stance to gather more information results in starvation, which is 
as obviously contrary to the goal of well-being as anything can be. So the 
default restrictiveness built into the notion of rationality is overridden 
by this meta-reason.
It is an interesting question whether such a meta-reason could be 
found in a purely cognitive case involving belief. Such a reason would 
have to be a reason for thinking that the option of withholding was so 
contrary to the achievement of the epistemic goal that one should either 
believe or disbelieve in spite of having no good reason to favor either 
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view over the other. The possibility of such cases, however, appears to 
be undermined by the fact that the epistemic goal is dual in nature. It 
involves both getting to the truth and avoiding error, implying that the 
only meta-reason there could be for overriding the default restrictiveness 
of the notion of rationality would be a reason for thinking that failure 
to believe or disbelieve would undermine one’s ability both to get to the 
truth and avoid error.
It is hard to imagine any possible situation in which there would be 
such a reason, and if so, we should expect the default setting of restrictive-
ness concerning rational belief to hold sway in every possible case. But 
perhaps there could be a meta-reason that shows that the default setting 
does not always hold sway. For reflective individuals, the question often 
arises whether to trust one’s cognitive abilities to discern truth from error 
in a particular domain of inquiry. Such a question is one with answers 
in terms of degree of trust warranted, rather than only answers in terms 
of whether or not to trust. When the question of self-trust arises, the 
possibility of a paralyzing effect arises if we imagine the person unable to 
commit to some particular answer to the question of how much self-trust 
is appropriate. Suppose you assess the evidence for a given claim p as 
overwhelmingly positive, but you also claim to have no idea whether you 
are worthy of self-trust in assessing the truth-value of p. If your attitude 
was that you slightly overestimate the force of the evidence for claims 
such as p, you could still rationally accept p. If your attitude was that 
you are always wrong about such matters, confusing reasons for p with 
reasons against p, then you could rationally disbelieve p. But so long as 
you withhold on whether you are deserving of any trust at all about such 
matters, so long as you take the position that full neutrality on whether you 
are trustworthy is the best position to hold, you have eliminated all hope 
of achieving the epistemic goal. You are paralyzed, rationally speaking.
So perhaps any attitude you take would be epistemically preferable 
from a purely epistemic point of view to this situation of paralysis. Unlike 
the practical situation, however, you cannot resolve the paralysis simply by 
making a choice to believe or disbelieve. But you may be able to choose 
whether to accept or dis-accept, and in so doing, set in motion chains 
of causal influence that result in beliefs of various sorts, beliefs that are 
thereby rational or irrational in virtue of whether they are appropriate 
means to the epistemic goal.
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I offer this example of self-trust, though, only as a possibility,13 for 
nothing turns on the question of whether analogues of the Buridan’s ass 
situation are possible in the cognitive sphere. If they are not possible, 
then the restrictive default setting of rationality can only be overridden 
in the practical sphere and not in the cognitive sphere. Even so, we will 
have an explanation of why rationality is less restrictive in some areas 
than in others without having to conclude that there are different notions 
of rationality at work in the two areas. It would be the same notion of 
rationality at work in both arenas, with the differences resulting from 
the impossibility of the existence of certain types of meta-reasons in 
the cognitive sphere. I myself am attracted to the idea that issues about 
self-trust show that such meta-reasons are possible in the cognitive sphere, 
but nothing turns on whether this idea is correct.
Conclusion
This account of the matter renders the appeal to the distinction between 
acceptance and belief impotent to save the pluralist from the difficulty 
caused by the Buridan’s Ass Paradox. The fact that acceptance is voluntary 
doesn’t take us any distance at all in showing that there is a rational 
resolution available to the pluralist who thinks that all religions are equally 
good. For to accept the claims of a religion is to accept them as true, and 
this the pluralist cannot rationally do except by abandoning his pluralism 
or corrupting it with revisionary tendencies toward actual religions.
There remains a residual feeling, however, that there is something that 
this pinning of the pluralist leaves out. It is the idea that mental states 
can be evaluated in terms of either the practical notion of rationality 
or the epistemic notion of rationality. All the above shows is that there 
is no epistemically rational way of escaping the problem raised for the 
pluralist by the Buridan’s Ass Paradox, but it doesn’t show that there is 
no practically rational way of escape. Since beliefs aren’t voluntary, the 
fact that it would be practically rational to believe some religion or other 
can’t eliminate the problem, since such features don’t typically prompt 
13 For extended discussion of the notion of self-trust and a defense of its centrality 
in the story of epistemic justification, see Keith Lehrer, Self Trust: A Study of Reason, 
Knowledge and Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
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belief. But since acceptance is voluntary, the practical considerations in 
question give one a practical reason to voluntarily accept some religion 
or other, and the pluralist can do that.
Though this point is correct, it ignores the way in which love of truth 
is central to religion. In Christianity, for example, the points about purity 
of heart and counsel against double-mindedness include alethic elements, 
so that engaging in religious practices while not doing so in virtue of the 
perceived truth of the view is a defect that needs to be overcome at some 
point in order for the promise of the beatific vision to be achieved. Given 
the centrality of such features of religion, the practical solution to the 
pluralists’ dilemma is a solution adopted for the purpose of losing one’s 
pluralist perspective in the process. It is thus a resolution of the dilemma 
only to the extent that it begins a process wherein the pluralist ceases to 
be one, for only in such a process can the great goods religion offers be 
appropriated. As such, it is not a pluralist solution to the dilemma, but 
rather a practical solution to the defect of finding oneself with pluralist 
views. A pluralist can escape the Buridan’s ass problem for pluralism with 
a practical decision, but the solution will not be a solution to the problem 
for pluralism, but rather a potential way of getting out of the problem by 
taking steps to abandon one’s pluralism. Such a solution is available in 
other ways as well, by evaluating the plausibility of the pluralist view itself 
and coming to see that it is false. But such a recommendation would not 
count as a solution to the Buridan’s ass problem for pluralism, but rather a 
recommendation for how to avoid that problem by avoiding the pluralist 
views that generate the problem. As such, pluralism itself remains lost at 
sea, even though those who hope to become former pluralists need not 
despair.
